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REVISITING “SPECIAL NEEDS” THEORY VIA 
AIRPORT SEARCHES† 
Alexander A. Reinert 
ABSTRACT—Controversy has raged since the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) introduced Advanced Imaging Technology, capable 
of producing detailed images of travelers’ bodies, and “enhanced” pat frisks 
as part of everyday airport travel. In the face of challenges in the courts and 
in public discourse, the TSA has justified the heightened security measures 
as a necessary means to prevent terrorist attacks. The purpose of this Essay 
is to situate the Fourth Amendment implications of the new regime within a 
broader historical context. Most germane, after the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) introduced sweeping new screening of air travelers 
in the 1960s and 1970s as a response to politically motivated “skyjacking,” 
it too was challenged in court. In the 1970s, courts often relied on the then-
novel “special needs” exception to uphold the FAA’s search regime despite 
the tensions it created in the doctrine. Although courts today will likely rely 
on similar reasoning to uphold the TSA’s new screening methods, I argue in 
this Essay that the TSA’s new search regime is more difficult to square with 
fundamental Fourth Amendment principles. Therefore, it is even more 
important that new doctrinal limitations on the ever-broadening special 
needs exception accompany any judicial acceptance of the TSA’s search 
regime. As much as possible, judicial approval of the new search program 
should be limited to its justifying purpose—safe air travel. Providing such 
limited approval would have evidentiary implications that I explore in this 
Essay. Seen in this light, the TSA’s new search regime offers an 
opportunity to revise and revisit special needs jurisprudence to minimize 
the risk that the exception will ultimately swallow the Fourth Amendment’s 
traditional preference for searches based on warrants and individualized 
suspicion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine for a moment occupying your spare time by reading random 
appellate opinions in the Federal Reporter and coming across the following 
passages in decisions addressing the Fourth Amendment limitations on 
airport searches: 
When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of 
dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a large airplane, 
the danger alone meets the test of reasonableness, so long as the search is 
conducted in good faith for the purpose of preventing hijacking or like damage 
and with reasonable scope and the passenger has been given advance notice of 
his liability to such a search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by 
air.1 
 The airport search is a direct reaction to the wave of airplane 
hijackings . . . , at which time popular feelings of fear and anger, and 
ultimately rage, called out for some program to safeguard air flights, and 
understandably so. Airplane hijacking is a particularly frightening crime. 
Many hijackers have been psychotic or political fanatics, for whom death 
holds no fear and little consequence . . . . Today, the general methodology of 
the airport search has become more or less routine.2 
The danger [of airplane hijacking] is so well known, the governmental interest 
so overwhelming, and the invasion of privacy so minimal, that the warrant 
requirement is excused by exigent national circumstances.3 
Surely you would be forgiven for thinking you were reading about the 
security measures recently put in place by the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA): specifically, the TSA’s installation of scanners that 
are capable of creating highly controversial images of random travelers as 
well as the “enhanced” pat frisks applied to passengers in certain 
circumstances. But the language quoted above is from a different era 
entirely—the period beginning in the late 1960s when federal appellate 
courts heard a slew of constitutional challenges to new security measures 
imposed by airlines and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the 
 
1  United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J., concurring). 
2  United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 803 (2d Cir. 1974). 
3  United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972). 
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wake of a sharp increase in politically motivated “skyjackings.” My goal in 
this Essay is to examine the controversy surrounding the TSA’s new airport 
search regime by reference to the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
developed in response to the first instantiation of mass airport searches. 
As I suggest below, to evaluate the strength of the arguments regarding 
the constitutionality of the TSA’s new airport search regime, it is important 
to look to the ways that courts resolved challenges to the earlier FAA search 
program. Reviewing that history demonstrates first that it is difficult to find 
the right doctrinal fit for searches like these. The searches affect large 
portions of the population, are based on no suspicion whatsoever, and are 
public in nature. Under traditional Fourth Amendment probable cause and 
warrant requirements, they would clearly not pass muster. Challenges to the 
FAA’s search regime, however, have almost uniformly failed. Thus, courts 
in the 1970s—taking their cue from the Supreme Court—stretched Fourth 
Amendment doctrine to accommodate what were viewed as important 
public interests in security. Some courts held that the passengers had 
implicitly consented to the searches by agreeing to travel on a plane.4 Some 
found the suspicion-based searches per se “reasonable” under the Fourth 
Amendment when individual privacy interests were balanced against the 
perceived need for them to deter and detect deadly skyjacking.5 And some 
courts treated routine airport searches as justified by “special needs,”6 like 
inspections of businesses or checkpoints to prevent drunk driving, when the 
traditional warrant and probable cause requirements can be suspended even 
in the absence of individualized suspicion.7 
Second, I think we can expect that, much like the courts of the 1970s, 
courts today will face pressure to fit the TSA’s new search regime into a 
workable Fourth Amendment doctrine to avoid depriving the government of 
an important tool in fighting terrorism.8 The three different Fourth 
Amendment approaches to the problem of airport searches in the 1970s—
consent, reasonableness balancing, and “special needs” analysis—remain 
relevant today. Indeed, the only appellate court to opine on the matter to 
 
4  See, e.g., United States v. Dalpiaz, 494 F.2d 374, 376 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that magnetometers 
and inspection of hand baggage are constitutional if a person has the opportunity to avoid the search by 
not boarding). 
5  See, e.g., Epperson, 454 F.2d at 771. 
6  The term “special needs” was introduced by Justice Blackmun in 1985. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. 325, 351–52 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). The principle of permitting 
searches without a warrant or on less than probable cause in special circumstances developed in the late 
1960s. See Alexander A. Reinert, Public Interest(s) and Fourth Amendment Enforcement, 2010 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1461, 1469–75 (summarizing cases). 
7  See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 61 F.3d 107, 109–10 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing cases to support the 
claim that “[r]outine security searches at airport checkpoints pass constitutional muster because the 
compelling public interest in curbing air piracy generally outweighs their limited intrusiveness”). 
8  The Supreme Court has routinely indicated in dicta that airport searches are constitutional under 
the special needs rationale. See infra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
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date concluded with little difficulty, resting in large part on precedent from 
the first era of airport searches, that the new search regime easily fit into the 
“administrative search” exception.9 And even though the same court found 
that the TSA’s new search regime was promulgated in violation of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, it declined to vacate the procedures because 
doing so “would severely disrupt an essential security operation.”10 
Finally, despite all this, the TSA’s new search regime is more difficult 
to square with fundamental Fourth Amendment principles than the FAA’s 
initial airport screening procedures. Therefore, precisely because of the 
pressure on courts to adjust Fourth Amendment doctrine to meet the 
perceived needs of the TSA and the traveling public, it is all the more 
important that new doctrinal limitations accompany any judicial acceptance 
of the TSA’s new search regime. Specifically, I argue here that if courts are 
to give the TSA’s new search regime constitutional approval, it must be 
limited to its justifying purpose—safe air travel—and it must be grounded 
in the special needs exception to warrantless and suspicionless searches. 
Making explicit what has been implicitly required by most of the Supreme 
Court’s special needs jurisprudence, I propose a special exclusionary rule 
for searches like those conducted by the TSA that will best limit the ex post 
utility of such searches to their ex ante justifications. Under my proposal, 
the use of evidence discovered as a result of mass suspicionless searches 
like the TSA’s screenings should be limited to prosecutions for offenses 
that relate to the asserted justifications for the search regime. This link 
between justification and permissible use is one novel way to limit the 
reach of a special needs justification for these airport searches. In a way, 
then, the TSA’s new search regime offers an opportunity to revise and 
revisit special needs jurisprudence to minimize the risk that the exception 
will ultimately swallow the Fourth Amendment’s traditional preference for 
searches based on warrants and individualized suspicion. 
I. AIRPORT SEARCH REGIMES IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
To ground this discussion, a brief history of the development of airport 
searches is necessary. Until the late 1960s, air travel could be idealized as a 
safe and fast, albeit expensive, transportation option in which the 
experience of flying itself was nearly as compelling as one’s destination.11 
The sudden increase in politically motivated hijackings of the late 1960s, a 
new and troubling phenomenon, brought fear into the equation.12 At its peak 
in 1969, so-called “skyjackers” successfully hijacked thirty-three planes and 
 
9  Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10–11 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
10  Id. at 8. 
11  See Dwayne Day, Aviation in Film and Television, U.S. CENTENNIAL FLIGHT COMMISSION, 
http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Social/aviation_TV_movies/SH5.htm (last visited July 25, 
2012). 
12  United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 803–04 (2d Cir. 1974). 
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attempted to hijack even more.13 The modern “airport search” flowed 
directly from these incidents, during a time when “popular feelings of fear 
and anger, and ultimately rage, called out for some program to safeguard air 
flights.”14 At that time, the FAA developed skyjack profiles that targeted 
particular passengers for enhanced screening with magnetometers, carry-on 
luggage searches, and frisks.15 The agency soon abandoned the profiling 
approach, however, in favor of expanded screening to encompass all 
passengers. Prior to boarding at the gate, the FAA required all passengers to 
pass through a magnetometer and surrender their carry-on items or their 
person for a more intrusive search in the event that the magnetometer was 
alerted.16 With some exceptions, this regime remained in place for decades, 
even after the tragic events of September 11. 
In the past two years, however, the TSA has introduced new security 
measures. The most technologically innovative aspect, Advanced Imaging 
Technology (AIT), has been called a “full body scan” or, more pejoratively, 
a “virtual strip search.” In contrast with an x-ray machine or walk-through 
metal detector, AIT machines are theoretically capable of detecting 
nonmetallic contraband, such as plastic explosives or similar material.17 
When the AIT scan identifies an anomaly (or when a passenger refuses to 
pass through an AIT machine), the TSA employs an enhanced pat frisk to 
detect its source. Passengers who opt out of these new procedures after 
entering the security line at an airport violate federal regulations and face 
substantial monetary penalties.18 
 
13  Id. at 804. 
14  Id. at 803. 
15  United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1082–85 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (describing the 
development of the skyjacker profile). Many appellate cases made reference to the FAA’s antiskyjack 
profile. See, e.g., United States. v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1273–74 (5th Cir. 1973) (“Because [the 
defendant] met the F.A.A. anti-skyjack profile . . . the . . . boarding agent detained him . . . .”); United 
States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 670 (2d Cir. 1972) (referring to the FAA’s list of criteria used to flag 
possible skyjackers who fit the profile). 
16  United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 898–902 (9th Cir. 1973) (recounting the history of the 
FAA’s approach), overruled by United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007). 
17  See Terrorism and Transportation Security: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Transp. Sec. of 
the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 3–4 (2011) (statement of John S. Pistole, Administrator, 
TSA). 
18  See 49 C.F.R. §§ 1540.105(a)(2), 1540.107 (2010); TSA, TSA SANCTION GUIDELINES 3 (2004), 
available at http://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/Sanction_Guidance_for_Individuals_7-15-2004.pdf 
(summarizing monetary sanctions for failure to undergo security screening after entering sterile area); 
see also Max Read, Man Threatened with $10,000 Fine After Refusing TSA Grope, GAWKER.COM (Nov. 
15, 2010), http://gawker.com/5689925/man-threatened-with-10000-fine-after-refusing-tsa-grope 
(reporting the tale of one individual “who was sent home from the airport after refusing both the 
TSA . . . x-ray machine [scan] and . . . ‘pat-down’—and was threatened with a $10,000 fine”); Security 
Protest May Hinder Thanksgiving Travel, CBS NEWS (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2010/11/22/national/main7077350.shtml (“Passengers cannot opt out of both the scan and the pat-down 
once they have been selected for the enhanced searches, according to TSA rules. If they then try to 
evade the measures, they could face an $11,000 fine.”). 
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Both the AIT and the enhanced pat frisk have provoked significant 
controversy from a broad swath of society. Objectors include civil liberties 
groups,19 medical professionals and others concerned about the safety of the 
new AIT process,20 and groups concerned that being subjected to AIT and 
enhanced pat frisks will traumatize survivors of sexual assault.21 Media 
have focused on some of the more outrageous abuses of the new 
technology.22 At least one state introduced a law that would criminalize the 
enhanced pat frisks when carried out during airport searches in the absence 
of probable cause.23 For some time, it appeared that the traveling public was 
in open revolt: there was talk of a national opt-out day on the day before 
Thanksgiving, in which travelers would forego screening by the AIT, 
requiring enhanced pat downs that would cripple the ability of security 
personnel to promptly screen air passengers and create hours of backups 
and delayed flights.24 In response, TSA officials sought to assure the public 
that the new search regimes were safe and protective of privacy, made a 
number of promises to reduce fears about the intrusiveness of the searches, 
and explored alternatives to the AIT that would reduce the detail of the 
images produced by the technology.25 
 
19  See Kade Crockford, TSA and the “Audacity of Grope,” BOSTON GLOBE: ON LIBERTY (Sept. 15, 
2010), http://boston.com/community/blogs/on_liberty/2010/09/tsa_and_the_audacity_of_grope.html 
(objecting to the TSA policy); Nedra Pickler, Group Says Body Scanners an ‘Unreasonable Search,’ 
WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/10/
AR2011031003628.html (reporting on a lawsuit filed by the Electronic Privacy Information Center). 
20  Susan Stellin, Are Scanners Worth the Risk?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2010), 
http://travel.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/travel/12prac.html. 
21   Press Release, Jessica Cavey, Nat’l Sexual Violence Res. Ctr., National Organization Calls For 
End to Invasive TSA Screening Methods (Nov. 24, 2010), available at http://www.nsvrc.org/news/3274; 
Press Release, Tracey Cox, Nat’l Sexual Violence Res. Ctr., NSVRC, TSA Explore Impact of Security 
Procedures on Sexual Assault Survivors (Dec. 7, 2010), available at http://www.nsvrc.org/news/3290. 
22  See, e.g., Crockford, supra note 19 (reporting on accounts of TSA agents conducting punitive pat 
downs on passengers who opt out of a full body scan and commenting on physical characteristics of co-
workers who passed through AIT scanners); Andrew Springer, Parents of 6-Year-Old Girl Pat Down at 
Airport Want Procedures Changed, ABC NEWS (Apr. 13, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/parents-
year-girl-pat-airport-procedures-changed/story?id=13363740; TSA Pat-Down Leaves Mich. Man 
Covered in Urine, CBS NEWS (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/11/22/
national/main7078699.shtml. 
23  See H.B. 1937, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011). 
24  See Security Protest May Hinder Thanksgiving Travel, supra note 18; Torches & Pitchforks at 
Airport Security, CBS NEWS (Nov. 21, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/11/19/
national/main7070150.shtml. 
25  See TSA Oversight Part I: Whole Body Imaging: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec., 
Homeland Def. & Foreign Operations of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. 
112–21 (2011) (statements of Robin E. Kane, Assistant Administrator for Security Technology, TSA, 
and Lee R. Kair, Assistant Administrator for Security Operations, TSA); Janet Napolitano, Scanners Are 
Safe, Pat-Downs Discreet, USA TODAY (Nov. 14, 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/
news/opinion/forum/2010-11-15-column15_ST1_N.htm; see also Blogger Bob, Enhanced Pat-Downs, 
TSA BLOG (Aug. 27, 2010, 4:29 PM), http://blog.tsa.gov/2010/08/enhanced-pat-downs.html 
(highlighting safety benefits of the TSA’s “layered approach to security”). 
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At the same time, government officials have maintained that the 
intrusion on privacy occasioned by the new airport search regime is 
minimal compared to the risk of harm from terrorist attacks by a 
“determined enemy.”26 This framing of the problem—as the balance 
between security and privacy—is often delivered in rhetorically stark terms. 
Consider TSA Director John Pistole’s response to a reporter questioning the 
invasive nature of the new TSA searches: 
“What it comes down to is that balance that we’ve been talking 
about” . . . . “How can we make sure that we don’t have an Abdulmutallab, an 
Underwear Bomber, who . . . [has a] non-metallic bomb on him that can cause 
catastrophic harm and kill hundreds of people in the air and perhaps people on 
the ground?”27 
Passengers, we are told, need to “readjust their expectations on what they 
are going to find at the airport.”28 
It is difficult to determine how effective these measures have been in 
deterring or reducing airplane hijackings. For example, between 1973 and 
1988, under the FAA’s old search regime, security personnel subjected over 
9.5 billion people to security screenings and inspected over 10 billion carry-
on items.29 Out of these screenings, screening agents detected more than 
41,000 firearms and arrested approximately 19,000 people.30 But it is 
unclear how many, if any at all, of those arrested or prosecuted as a result of 
the FAA’s airport searches were planning terrorist attacks. Similarly, after 
one year of operation, the TSA reported that the new AIT measures had 
“detected more than 130 prohibited, illegal or dangerous items” but 
declined to specify whether any were in the nature of hijacking threats, 
offering as examples ceramic knives and various drugs.31 The TSA declined 
to state whether the new screening measures (or even behavioral detection) 
had identified any terrorists, citing national security concerns.32 Moreover, 
the Governmental Accountability Office has cast doubt on whether the AIT 
 
26  Napolitano, supra note 25. 
27  TSA: We’re Trying to Balance Safety, Dignity, CBS NEWS (Nov. 23, 2010, 8:35 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/11/22/earlyshow/main7078173.shtml. 
28  Diane Macedo, TSA: New Scanners Kept Many Illegal or Dangerous Items Off Planes This Year, 
FOXNEWS.COM (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/11/18/tsa-enhanced-imaging-kept-
illegal-dangerous-items-plans-year (quoting International Air Transport Association spokesman Steve 
Lott) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
29  See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., REPORT NO. DOT/FAA-ACS-88-1(28), 
SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY 
PROGRAM Exhibit 6 (1988). 
30  Id. 
31  Macedo, supra note 28. 
32  Juliet Lapidos, Does the TSA Ever Catch Terrorists?, SLATE (Nov. 18, 2010, 6:12 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2275448. 
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would have detected the incident involving Abdulmutallab referred to by 
Director Pistole.33 
The measures’ effectiveness, however, is only minimally relevant to 
whether the measures are constitutional, which is an issue that has yet to be 
resolved.34 At least two different lawsuits have been filed challenging the 
constitutionality of the new screening measures. The Electronic Privacy 
Information Center (EPIC) has, unsuccessfully to date, argued that the new 
rules violate the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fourth 
Amendment.35 Two airline pilots have also filed suit in federal district court, 
arguing, inter alia, that the new procedures violate their Fourth Amendment 
rights.36 I now turn to these constitutional questions. 
II. AIRPORT SEARCH REGIMES IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT CONTEXT 
The late 1960s were marked by changes not only in the nature of air 
travel, described above, but also by changes in the direction of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine. The FAA’s new policies regarding airport searches 
emerged just as lower courts were grappling with the implications of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Camara v. Municipal Court of San 
Francisco37 and Terry v. Ohio.38 Camara and Terry were game changers 
when compared to traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. As 
numerous commentators have observed, the history of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence reflects a struggle between the more general Reasonableness 
Clause of the Fourth Amendment and the more specific Warrant Clause, 
which requires that warrants to support searches or seizures be issued on 
probable cause.39 For most of the history of Fourth Amendment 
 
33  Spencer S. Hsu, GAO Says Airport Body Scanners May Not Have Thwarted Christmas Day 
Bombing, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/
03/17/AR2010031700649.html. 
34  Jeffrey Rosen, for one, has maintained that the AIT body scans may be unconstitutional based on 
the fact that they reveal highly private information without any proven effectiveness. Jeffrey Rosen, Why 
the TSA Pat-Downs and Body Scans Are Unconstitutional, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2010), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/24/AR2010112404510_pf.html. However, the 
Supreme Court has never required that particular searches be the most effective way of meeting a 
particular security problem, so it is unclear that most courts would adopt Rosen’s view. See, e.g., Bd. of 
Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002). 
35  See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
36  See Roberts v. Napolitano, 798 F. Supp. 2d 7, 9 (D.D.C. 2011). The district court recently held 
that jurisdiction over the complaint lies exclusively with the D.C. Circuit because the plaintiffs sought to 
challenge a final agency rule. See id. at 10–11. Given the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Electronic Privacy 
Information Center v. United States Department of Homeland Security, 653 F.3d at 1, the Roberts 
plaintiffs would appear to have a hard row to hoe. 
37  387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
38  392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
39  See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The tension in the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis that 
has received the most attention is its attempt to resolve the Warrant Clause—which requires that judicial 
warrants be particular as to their scope and supported by probable cause—with the Reasonableness 
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interpretation, the Warrant Clause and the Reasonableness Clause worked 
together simply: searches or seizures that did not comply with the Warrant 
Clause’s mandates—probable cause and magistrate screening of warrants—
were by definition unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.40 Terry and 
Camara, however, signaled the beginning of the end for the centrality of the 
Warrant Clause to Fourth Amendment inquiries, announcing an overall 
reasonableness inquiry based on the “totality of the circumstances” and the 
balance between public and private interests.41 
In Camara, the Court held that neither a specific warrant nor 
traditional probable cause was necessary to support a search by city housing 
inspectors42 because the private homeowner’s interest in privacy was 
outweighed by the public’s interest in health and safety.43 The Court 
accepted a departure from the traditional probable cause requirement to 
accommodate the balance between public need and individual rights 
implicated by the searches.44 Terry considered a different variation of the 
trend to reasonableness instituted by Camara—the stop and frisk of two 
suspicious men on the street without a warrant and without probable 
cause.45 Relying on Camara’s reasonableness analysis—balancing the need 
to search against the invasion entailed by the search46—the Terry Court 
determined that neither a warrant nor probable cause was necessary for the 
stop and frisk. The Court identified solving crimes and assuring an officer’s 
safety as public interests of such importance that requiring probable cause 
was inappropriate.47 The Court nonetheless insisted that there be some 
degree of individualized suspicion, some reason to single out an individual 
 
Clause—which “secure[s] . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Id. Judges and scholars have 
long disputed whether the two clauses should be read conjunctively or disjunctively; i.e., whether an 
intrusion can be reasonable if it is not supported by probable cause and a specific warrant. See, e.g., 
Reinert, supra note 6, at 1464 n.8 (summarizing literature and jurisprudence). 
40  See Reinert, supra note 6, at 1467–69 (discussing the general rule and limited exceptions). 
41  See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (“‘[U]nder our general Fourth 
Amendment approach’ we ‘examin[e] the totality of the circumstances’ to determine whether a search is 
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” (alteration in original) (quoting United States 
v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001))). 
42  The suspicion required in Camara was not “individualized” in the traditional Fourth Amendment 
sense because it did not require “specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling.” 387 
U.S. at 538. As a result, warrants could be issued for searches of particular areas, so long as an 
inspection of the general area was justified by “the passage of time, the nature of the building (e.g., a 
multifamily apartment house), or the condition of the entire area.” Id. 
43  Id. at 534–36. 
44  Id. at 534. 
45  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1968). 
46  Id. at 21. 
47  Id. at 23–24. 
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for a “stop” and “frisk,” because of the significance of the intrusion on 
individual rights.48 
As I have written elsewhere, Camara and Terry laid the groundwork 
for modern Fourth Amendment inquiries, in which courts apply an ad hoc 
balancing test between public interests and private intrusions to determine 
the reasonableness of a search or seizure.49 In the traditional framework in 
which the Warrant Clause had primacy, courts did not consider competing 
“public” or “private” interests—an intrusion either was consistent with the 
Warrant Clause, in which case it was constitutional, or it was not.50 The 
airport searches adopted in the late 1960s, then, occupied an uncertain 
Fourth Amendment space. Judged under the traditional standard requiring a 
warrant and probable cause, it was clear that the new airport searches would 
not pass muster. The intrusions were clearly governed by the Fourth 
Amendment.51 Yet airport searches were mass searches based on no 
particularized suspicion whatsoever, and there was no procedure by which a 
warrant could be obtained for each passenger subjected to a search. Under 
traditional standards, there seemed to be little question of their 
unconstitutionality. Under the theories that won the day in Camara and 
Terry, however, the constitutionality of the new searches was more tenable. 
It was not obvious at first that Camara and Terry’s overall 
reasonableness formulation would displace the traditional focus on the 
presence of a warrant and probable cause. But the courts that considered the 
constitutionality of airport searches in the 1970s certainly saw the 
connection. This should be no surprise. First, as discussed above, it was 
difficult, if not impossible, to see how the airport searches could be found 
constitutional under the traditional approach to the Fourth Amendment. 
 
48  Id. at 24–25 (“Even a limited search . . . constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon 
cherished personal security, and it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating 
experience.”); id. at 27 (“The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the 
issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his 
safety or that of others was in danger . . . .” Additionally, “in determining whether the officer acted 
reasonably . . . due weight must be given . . . to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to 
draw from the facts in light of his experience.”). The standard of individualized suspicion adopted by the 
Terry Court has come to be known as “reasonable suspicion.” See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 
405, 415 (2005). 
49  See Reinert, supra note 6, at 1468–75. 
50  See id. at 1467–69. 
51  Although the appellate courts reviewing airport searches were in disagreement about the rationale 
by which they should be upheld against challenge, all courts agreed on one preliminary point: namely, 
that airport searches, whether via magnetometer, searches of luggage, or frisks, were relevant Fourth 
Amendment intrusions. See, e.g., United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 803 (2d Cir. 1974) (agreeing 
that the use of a magnetometer is no different than a frisk for Fourth Amendment purposes); United 
States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 1972) (same). In other words, the searches invaded some 
reasonable expectation of privacy. The courts generally rejected the occasional argument by the federal 
government that airplane passengers experienced a diminished expectation of privacy such that the 
Fourth Amendment played no role. See, e.g., Albarado, 495 F.2d at 806; Epperson, 454 F.2d at 770. 
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Second, like Camara and Terry, airport searches were different than 
traditional searches for evidence of a crime. Camara and Terry involved 
searches that were responsive to problems perceived to be both distinct and 
urban—in Camara, the need to maintain public health and welfare in urban 
communities,52 and in Terry, the need to act preventatively in the face of 
rising street crime.53 Similarly, most perceived the new airport search 
regime to be responsive to the distinct problem of airplane hijacking, which 
had created widespread fear and panic. Finally, the airport searches 
resembled Camara and Terry in that they were less intrusive than 
traditional searches and seizures. 
As one would expect, then, both Camara and Terry were significant 
factors in the appellate court decisions rejecting Fourth Amendment 
challenges to airport searches. Even with the advent of these decisions, 
however, appellate courts could not agree on an underlying rationale, 
reflecting the confusion in Fourth Amendment doctrine at the time. Courts 
ultimately rested their conclusions on three sometimes-overlapping 
principles to find that airport searches were constitutional. 
First, a minority of courts considered the question through the lens of 
consent. It has long been established that a search or seizure is by definition 
reasonable, and therefore constitutional, when it is the product of consent.54 
And although consent implies the right to refuse without sanction, the 
Supreme Court has made it clear that consent may be voluntary and valid 
even where the consenting party subjectively believes that she has no 
choice in the matter.55 Working with this theory in some cases, the 
government successfully argued that an airline passenger implicitly 
consented to the antihijacking screening simply by entering the pre-
boarding area in which the screening was to take place.56 When a court 
relied on consent, what became critical was the ability (whether known or 
not) of the passenger to avoid search by either not boarding the aircraft or 
not entering the preboarding line.57 For instance, the Colorado Supreme 
 
52  See 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967). 
53  See 392 U.S. at 10–11. 
54  See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222–23 (1973); Zap v. United States, 
328 U.S. 624, 628–30 (1946). 
55  See, e.g., Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224–25. 
56  See, e.g., United States v. Freeland, 562 F.2d 383, 385–86 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that a luggage 
search is valid even though the defendant was not advised that he could ask to have his luggage returned 
rather than have it searched). 
57  See id.; United States v. Dalpiaz, 494 F.2d 374, 376 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that magnetometers 
and inspections of hand baggage are constitutional if a person has the opportunity to avoid the search by 
not boarding). Knowledge seemed to matter somewhat, however, in United States v. Freeland because 
the court based its decision in part on a sign at the ticket desk that made it clear that passengers could 
refuse to board and withdraw their baggage. See 562 F.2d at 385–86. New York’s Court of Appeals 
came to a similar conclusion, making critical the ability of a passenger to withdraw baggage from a 
flight and thereby avoid the search. See People v. Kuhn, 306 N.E.2d 777, 779–80 (N.Y. 1973). 
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Court has more recently approved of an airport search based on a consent 
rationale.58 The court acknowledged that a passenger may avoid an airport 
search by leaving the checkpoint area prior to the commencement of the 
search without fear that the departure will itself provide a justification for a 
suspicion-based search.59 But once the screening process begins, the 
passenger is deemed to have consented to the full course, including searches 
more invasive than a magnetometer, so long as the search “is no more 
intrusive than necessary to achieve the objective of air safety.”60 
Second, most courts, perhaps recognizing the limitations of the consent 
theory, rested more generally on a “reasonableness” balancing approach to 
find airport searches constitutional. Often this involved reliance on 
traditional, suspicion-based justifications for searches, but it sometimes led 
courts to permit even suspicionless searches. Thus, where a passenger was 
subjected to a more intrusive search of his person and luggage after alerting 
a magnetometer, some courts analogized to the “reasonable suspicion” 
standard from Terry.61 Others relied on the reasonableness framework from 
Camara to conclude that warrantless and suspicionless searches were 
appropriate because of the degree of harm that plane hijackings could 
cause.62 Whether relying on Terry or Camara, however, the logic was 
simple: the governmental interest in preventing hijacking was 
“overwhelming,” the intrusion on privacy was “minimal,” and therefore the 
need for a warrant and suspicion was “excused by exigent national 
circumstances.”63 These balancing approaches to the problem often 
emphasized the unique problem of hijacking—it was difficult to detect 
before it began and effective deterrence must be balanced against the need 
to minimize disruption of air travel.64 
 
58  People v. Heimel, 812 P.2d 1177, 1181–82 (Colo. 1991). 
59  Id. at 1181 (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991)). 
60  Id. at 1181–82. 
61  Dalpiaz, 494 F.2d at 376–77. A number of different courts of appeals took this position, at least 
as it respected searches of the person. E.g., United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 47 (5th Cir. 1973); 
United States v. Riggs, 474 F.2d 699, 702–04 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 672–
73 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770–72 (4th Cir. 1972). 
62  See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir. 1973), overruled by United States v. 
Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182 (3d Cir. 1971). 
63  Epperson, 454 F.2d at 771; see also Slocum, 464 F.2d at 1182 (citing Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 
U.S. 523, 539 (1967)) (“[W]e conclude that within the context of a potential hijacking the necessarily 
limited ‘search’ accomplished by use of the magnetometer per se is justified by a reasonable 
governmental interest in protecting national air commerce.”). 
64  Dalpiaz, 494 F.2d at 378 (citing Moreno, 475 F.2d at 49). The Fifth Circuit went so far as to hold 
that “the standards for initiating a search of a person at the boarding gate should be no more stringent 
than those applied in border crossing situations.” United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th 
Cir. 1973). The court reasoned as follows: 
In the critical pre-boarding area where this search started, reasonableness does not require that 
officers search only those passengers who meet a profile or who manifest signs of nervousness or 
who otherwise appear suspicious. Such a requirement would have to assume that hijackers are 
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Aside from consent and general balancing, there was a third approach, 
also informed by Camara: the “administrative search” or “special needs” 
justification.65 Under the administrative search regime, warrants and 
probable cause are still presumptively required by the Fourth Amendment, 
but an exception is made where the “direct and primary purpose” of a 
governmental regime is pursuing ends that are not “normal” law 
enforcement goals.66 Courts that adopted this approach recognized that 
airport searches could not be justified based on traditional requirements of 
probable cause and a warrant; resting on Terry was unsatisfactory because 
in Terry there was some individualized suspicion that justified the 
intrusion.67 Thus, unlike Terry, a suspicionless search regime like the type 
used in airports fits more comfortably within the administrative search or 
special needs rubric. 
Reflecting the confusing and diffuse nature of Fourth Amendment 
analysis, however, many opinions blended all three approaches. Thus, a 
Fifth Circuit decision relied on elements of consent, general balancing, and 
special needs.68 Similarly, the Third Circuit found preboarding pat frisks for 
all passengers reasonable (the magnetometer had not yet been installed) 
based on traditional balancing and consent.69 The Fourth Circuit applied a 
related analysis, although with a broader consent rationale.70 
 
readily identifiable or that they invariably possess certain traits. The number of lives placed at 
hazard by this criminal paranoia forbid taking such deadly chances. 
Id. 
65  See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 61 F.3d 107, 109–10 (1st Cir. 1995). The special needs exception 
is the modern iteration of the administrative search exception. See Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling 
Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 275–76 (2011) (summarizing and criticizing the 
Court’s use of the administrative search rationale in special needs cases involving both mass and 
individual intrusions). 
66  See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78–84 (2001) (rejecting a program that had 
the immediate purpose of collecting evidence for ordinary law enforcement objectives even though the 
ultimate purpose of the program may have been motivated by a non-law enforcement goal); id. at 86 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). 
67  See, e.g., Davis, 482 F.2d at 906–09, overruled by Aukai, 497 F.3d at 955. 
68  United States v. Wehrli, 637 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1981) (considering the constitutionality of a 
security checkpoint search of a passenger’s carry-on luggage that led to the discovery of cocaine). As to 
consent, the court emphasized the voluntariness of the encounter. Id. at 409. As to general balancing, the 
intrusion on the passenger was limited because the search was not stigmatic and because airlines had an 
incentive to minimize passenger discomfort that could result from “air piracy.” Id. The governmental 
interests included the vulnerability of airplanes to piracy and hijacking and the unusual detection 
problems because a hijacker has no interest in secrecy once the decision to act has been made. Id. at 
409–10. Finally, emphasizing the special needs analysis, the court found that the reasonableness of the 
search was enhanced because “it did not range beyond an area reasonably calculated to discover dangers 
to air safety.” Id. at 410. 
69  Singleton v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 606 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1979) (considering the 
constitutionality of a preboarding search of a passenger’s suit jacket that led to the discovery of 
incriminating cash). Using a reasonableness analysis, the court held that without a search “there is no 
effective means of detecting which airline passengers are reasonably likely to hijack an airplane, and 
[courts] have therefore held that some pre-boarding screening search of each passenger sufficient in 
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Although numerous appellate courts have considered the 
constitutionality of suspicionless airport searches from the 1970s, the 
Supreme Court has never directly considered the issue. The Court has only 
occasionally suggested, in dicta, that these searches pass muster.71 Thus, in 
1989, the Court appeared to accept the administrative search rationale for 
such intrusions, citing extensively to Judge Friendly’s decision in United 
States v. Edwards, which focused on notice to the passenger and the 
opportunity to withdraw.72 And although the Court recognized that the 
searches were originally justified by an existing crisis of skyjacking, the 
Court seemed willing to tolerate such searches even when that exigency had 
dissipated.73 In any event, since the 1970s, nothing about the Fourth 
Amendment landscape has changed to call into question the 
constitutionality of mass airport searches along the lines that were 
originally introduced by the FAA.74 
 
scope to detect the presence of weapons and explosives is reasonable under the fourth amendment.” Id. 
at 52. The court’s emphasis on consent was apparent from its recognition that passengers could elect not 
to be searched by declining not to board the airplane. Id. 
70  United States v. DeAngelo, 584 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1978). In DeAngelo, when a passenger’s carry-
on luggage “appeared black on the x-ray screen,” he was informed that a physical examination of the 
bag would be necessary. The passenger stated that he would prefer not to fly than to have the bag 
inspected, but the officer opened the case and discovered marijuana and hashish. Id. at 47. Applying 
Terry, the court held that “circumstances were sufficiently suspicious to cause a reasonably prudent man 
to conclude that DeAngelo might endanger the security officers and the other passengers in the airport.” 
Id. Although the passenger attempted to withdraw consent, there was a sign that stated that a physical 
examination of luggage “may be requested,” which the court held constituted consent to a full search 
once the passenger entered the screening process. Id. at 47–48. 
71  See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674–675 & n.3 (1989); see also 
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47–48 (“Our holding also does not affect the validity of . . . searches at places like 
airports and government buildings, where the need for such measures to ensure public safety can be 
particularly acute.”); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (“We reiterate, too, that where the 
risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank 
as ‘reasonable’—for example, searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and other 
official buildings.”). 
72  Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674–75 & n.3 (citing United Stated v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 
1974); United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275–76 (5th Cir. 1973); Davis, 482 F.2d at 907–12). 
73  As the Court explained: 
It is true, as counsel for petitioners pointed out at oral argument, that these air piracy precautions 
were adopted in response to an observable national and international hijacking crisis. Yet we 
would not suppose that, if the validity of these searches be conceded, the Government would be 
precluded from conducting them absent a demonstration of danger as to any particular airport or 
airline. 
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 675 n.3 (citation omitted). 
74  If anything, the Fourth Amendment has become even friendlier to law enforcement and national 
security interests, given the rise of ad hoc balancing and the minimization of the warrant and probable 
cause requirements. 
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III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND TSA’S CURRENT 
AIRPORT SEARCH REGIME 
There are solid doctrinal bases for arguing that the TSA’s search 
regime violates the Fourth Amendment, but this Part will not rehearse these 
arguments.75 In my view, they are unlikely to succeed because of the long 
precedent in favor of airport searches, the perceived need to validate even 
intrusive searches where fears of terrorism loom in the background, and the 
general trend in the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.76 
But precisely because there are good doctrinal grounds for finding the new 
search regime unconstitutional, any holding validating the TSA’s new 
search regime will likely create tension in Fourth Amendment doctrine. My 
goal here is to examine the different grounds that are available for finding 
the TSA’s new practice constitutional, with an eye towards identifying the 
ground that will least disrupt existing Fourth Amendment principles. As I 
elaborate below, a special needs-type analysis is ultimately the best 
candidate, provided certain conditions are imposed on its use. 
Recall that lower courts in the 1970s looked to three justifications to 
uphold airport searches: consent, general balancing, and special needs. Just 
as in the 1970s, these three grounds are the most likely candidates on which 
to rest the constitutionality of the TSA’s new search regime. I will start with 
consent theory, which has one distinct advantage: simplicity. It does not 
 
75  The use of the AIT machine, after all, is far different from the magnetometer approved in prior 
cases. Unlike the magnetometer, the AIT is capable of producing an image of the passenger that some 
critics have likened to pornography. See Editorial, Government Pornography Ring, WASH. TIMES (July 
22, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jul/22/government-pornography-ring. When the 
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of thermal imaging devices, arguably less intrusive than 
AIT scanners, it concluded that “[w]here, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general 
public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical 
intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.” Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). Applying this analysis to the TSA’s use of an AIT machine, one 
could argue that the AIT scanner, like the thermal imaging device, explores the details of passengers’ 
bodies in a way that is most analogous to a strip search. Using this conceptualization, it is hard to 
imagine a court finding that subjecting passengers to an AIT scan, in the absence of any individualized 
suspicion, is permissible. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 & n.4 
(1985) (holding that reasonable suspicion is required to engage in extended detention of a traveler at a 
border, but refusing to consider what level of suspicion “is required for nonroutine border searches such 
as strip, body-cavity, or involuntary x-ray searches”); United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1002–03 
(9th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing “highly intrusive searches of the person” from the substantially less 
intrusive search of a person’s package or vehicle); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 
2006) (“Routine searches include those searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or 
shoes which, unlike strip searches, do not substantially infringe on a traveler’s privacy rights.”). Even in 
contexts in which the Supreme Court has generally tolerated greater intrusion on privacy—say, public 
schools—it has drawn the line at strip searches. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 
364, 374–77 (2009). 
76  I do not wish to overstate the latter factor. Kyllo, Ferguson, and Edmond, among other cases, 
stand as relatively recent examples of the Court’s willingness to limit law enforcement power via the 
Fourth Amendment. 
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require any balancing. At most, it may require some consideration of the 
scope of consent. For instance, if a screening proceeds from a 
magnetometer to a pat frisk to a body cavity search, one might need to find 
consent for each degree of intrusion.77 But arguably, any reasonable person 
would feel “free to leave” rather than enter the screening area of an airport, 
and therefore could be found to have implicitly consented to the TSA’s new 
search regime, at least insofar as the traveling public is informed in advance 
of the contemplated scope of the intrusion.78 
Although consent as a matter of theory is simple, it also is quite 
difficult to cabin. If indeed there is consent to Fourth Amendment 
intrusions every time one chooses to travel by air, there is no principled 
reason why there should not be consent every time one chooses to travel by 
car, foot, or mass transportation. One could imagine screening checkpoints 
imposed at every street corner, on the theory that passersby “consented” to 
the intrusion. And, hypothetically, there is no natural stopping point with 
regard to the scope of intrusion. Presumably, if everyone were informed 
that they would be strip searched prior to entering, say, a building, they 
could be deemed to have consented.79 In theory, the only limitation on the 
use of such consent-based searches would be the resources of the state, not 
the Fourth Amendment. 
The Second Circuit recognized this argument in United States v. 
Albarado, rejecting a consent-based rationale for airport searches.80 For the 
court, making one choose between exercising one’s constitutional right and 
flying to one’s destination, “however subtle,” is coercion.81 Drawing an 
analogy to the use of telephones, the court noted that if the government 
announced that it would tap all telephones, the use of a telephone would not 
constitute meaningful consent to the search, even if other means of 
communication—“carrier pigeons, two cans and a length of string”—
existed.82 Consent theory is, in short, a weak and potentially far-reaching 
ground for finding airport searches constitutional. 
Like the consent rationale, an ad hoc balancing approach has some 
appeal, but it also is difficult to constrain. When courts engage in 
reasonableness balancing under the Fourth Amendment, they attempt to 
weigh public interests (such as law enforcement and national security) 
 
77  Although People v. Heimel suggests, to the contrary, that prior consent to the procedures by 
which a search is to take place is consent to all it entails. See 812 P.2d 1177, 1181–82 (Colo. 1991). 
78  Cf. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435–36 (1991) (holding that a bus passenger was “free to 
leave” a bus to avoid a search and seizure—his confinement on the bus “was [merely] the natural result 
of his decision to take the bus”). 
79  Exceptions might be made where the restriction on entry infringed some other important right. 
80  495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974). 
81  Id. at 806–07. 
82  Id. at 807 n.14 (“[I]t is often a necessity of modern living to use a telephone. So also is it often a 
necessity to fly on a commercial airliner, and to force one to choose between that necessity and the 
exercise of a constitutional right is coercion in the constitutional sense.”). 
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against individual interests (such as privacy and autonomy). Moreover, 
courts view these interests as always in tension with each other—the public 
only benefits when security or law enforcement is vindicated and is only 
harmed when individual interests are upheld. Striking down a particular 
Fourth Amendment intrusion in this context is therefore always viewed as 
imposing some social cost. As I have argued before, there is no space in the 
Court’s balancing analysis for public interests—what I have called 
collective values—that are tied to individual interests in privacy and 
autonomy and are also in tension with the public interests in law 
enforcement and national security.83 For some, an expansion of 
suspicionless searches will create fear and apprehension in public spaces, 
thereby decreasing full participation in civic life. In other words, some 
collective values are actually enhanced by individual privacy and 
autonomy.84 
How does this apply in the airport search context? First, when courts 
have looked at the individual interests at stake, they have minimized the 
intrusion occasioned by airport searches for three principal reasons: (1) the 
technology only searches for the presence of prohibited items on a 
passenger, (2) every passenger is subjected to the same initial security 
screening, thus minimizing any stigma, and (3) the traveling public is well 
aware of the kinds of screenings that take place prior to boarding an 
airplane, so there is no possibility that the searches will take an individual 
by surprise. On the public interest side of the balance, courts emphasized 
the massive harm that could occur if a hijacker were able to pass through 
the boarding process unimpeded. 
Even jurists in the 1970s recognized the difficulty of using a balancing 
analysis. Judge James Oakes, concurring in the result in a Second Circuit 
case that upheld a search on a balancing theory, objected to the majority’s 
suggestion that the immense danger of skyjacking made any search 
reasonable.85 He expressed worry over how easy it was to permit stepwise 
marginal encroachments on privacy in the face of a threat of substantial 
danger, particularly when the basis for finding the search reasonable rested 
on the fact that it applied universally to all passengers.86 When the harm that 
is at stake is terrorism or threats to national security, using balancing 
 
83  See generally Reinert, supra note 6, at 1475–83 (contrasting the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence with free speech and due process principles). 
84  See id. at 1485–91. 
85  United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 501–02 (2d Cir. 1974) (Oakes, J., concurring in the 
result). 
86  Id. at 502 (“Today airports, tomorrow some other forms of search, which may be ‘applied to 
everyone’ in the words of Judge Friendly’s majority opinion.”). 
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analysis will be even more fraught with difficulty because of the presence 
of cognitive biases that tend to overstate both the level and risk of harm.87 
Applying balancing analysis in the context of the TSA’s new search 
regime makes the difficulty with the framework even more apparent. Like 
the screening programs that were challenged and upheld in the 1970s, the 
new measures, at least on their face, apply to everyone. And while more 
intrusive than the prior regimes, there is nothing in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence to tell us how much this additional intrusiveness matters. In 
some ways the intrusiveness is marginally no more than that which was 
occasioned by the initial screenings. That is, when compared to what was 
extant at the time, the additional intrusion is arguably just as marginal. On 
the other side of the balancing regime is the terrifying prospect of another 
terrorist attack, the risk of success of which is unknown, although the 
likelihood of an attempt is commonly thought to be inevitable. In this 
world, where privacy intrusions are minimized, degree of harm is high, and 
likelihood that someone will attempt an attack (even if unsuccessfully) also 
is high, courts will have little trouble finding the new screening regime 
constitutional. But balancing may also lead to the conclusion that any 
marginal enhancement of the TSA’s search regime—e.g., pat frisks of all 
passengers—is constitutional. Balancing analysis will tell us that we must 
weigh these considerations against each other, but it gives us no way to 
weigh them. 
Nor does balancing analysis admit of the possibility that there are 
multiple dimensions of public interest. With balancing analysis, an 
individual’s interest in avoiding unwanted government intrusion is adverse 
to society’s interest in safety or security.88 This is both an analytical and a 
rhetorical bias, and it reflects the Supreme Court’s failure to view Fourth 
Amendment protections as vindicating a valuable social interest. The 
balancing test—and the “balancing” language itself—assumes that the 
interests of “the people” and “the individual” will always be in tension with 
each other. It fails to imagine the possibility that society’s interests could 
themselves be in conflict. In combination with the shift in understanding of 
the meaning of individualized suspicion, the result is a Fourth Amendment 
doctrine that systematically underenforces the substantive values in privacy 
and autonomy served by the warrant and particularized suspicion 
requirements.89 Thus, the Court has come to rely on its balancing test to 
 
87  See generally Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security 
Decisions, and the Rule of Law, 96 IOWA L. REV. 195, 205–20 (2010) (summarizing the role of 
cognitive biases in national security decisionmaking). 
88  See Reinert, supra note 6, at 1473–75. 
89  See id. at 1475 & n.75. 
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express “a powerful and undeniable preference for collective security over 
individual privacy.”90 
If consent and ad hoc balancing leave something to be desired, what 
about special needs? As described above, many lower courts relied on 
special needs analysis to find airport searches constitutional in the 1970s. 
The Supreme Court itself has suggested in dicta that airport searches fall 
within the special needs rubric. And more recent cases that have considered 
airport searches and analogous programs have generally looked to the 
special needs exception to find such searches constitutional. Thus, the Third 
Circuit, in an opinion by then-Judge Samuel Alito, relied on special needs 
to uphold an airport search by the TSA.91 
Outside of the airport search context, courts have relied on the special 
needs rubric to uphold suspicionless search programs initiated as a response 
to fears of terrorism against mass transit. In a challenge to suspicionless 
searches of ferry commuters’ luggage, the Second Circuit relied on the 
special needs analysis rather than the general reasonableness approach that 
carried the day in its prior airport cases.92 In MacWade v. Kelly, the same 
court took up a related question: the permissibility of random suspicionless 
container searches on New York City subways.93 Holding that the searches 
were justified under the special needs doctrine, the court treated its prior 
airport search cases as being founded primarily on a special needs theory.94 
The court found that the random and unpredictable nature of the searches 
was the key to deterrence95 and that the special need of “preventing a 
terrorist attack on the subway” justified the suspicionless nature of the 
search.96 
One of the reasons that special needs analysis is a compelling choice is 
that the Supreme Court has subjected almost every suspicionless search 
regime to the special needs test.97 And recently, the Court has made clear 
that the analysis is generally used only where law enforcement is not the 
primary and immediate purpose of the search.98 Thus, whereas both consent 
and ad hoc balancing pay no heed to the goals of the challenged search 
regime, in special needs jurisprudence, the goals must be strictly scrutinized 
 
90  John M. Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The Scope of the Protection, 79 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1105, 1121 (1989). 
91  United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 177–79 (3d Cir. 2006). 
92  Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2006). 
93  460 F.3d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 2006). 
94  Id. at 268–69 (citing with approval United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974) and 
United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974)). 
95  Id. at 273–75. 
96  Id. at 270–71. 
97  See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 77–78 (2001) (reviewing the case law and 
distinguishing the case at issue from the facts of prior cases). 
98  See, e.g., id. at 78–84; id. at 86 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). 
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to ensure that the state is not evading the traditional warrant and 
individualized suspicion requirements through the back door of special 
needs. This limitation—that the suspicionless search regime be geared to 
something other than “ordinary” law enforcement needs99—is a difficult 
requirement to satisfy and airport searches would seem to be a tough case. 
The basic question that must be answered is whether preventing terrorist 
attacks on air travel vindicates “ordinary law enforcement” needs or 
something different and hence “special.” 
I am sympathetic to the argument that preventing terrorism is primarily 
a law enforcement goal, perhaps of a different degree than preventing drug 
trafficking, but not of a different kind. This sympathy circles back to how I 
began this Part—there are substantial arguments for finding the TSA’s 
airport searches unconstitutional. But if forced to choose the justification 
that best accords with finding the TSA’s searches constitutional, special 
needs would appear to be it. Unlike drug trafficking, drug use, or other 
justifications for mass suspicionless searches that the Supreme Court has 
rejected on special needs grounds, the terrorism-based justification for 
airport searches is founded on a threat to life and limb that is direct and 
contemporaneous with the search. In this way, they could be analogized to 
the sobriety checkpoints upheld in Michigan Department of State Police v. 
Sitz.100 Would-be terrorists pose a threat the instant they board an airplane, 
and airport searches are calibrated to reduce that threat. 
IV. LIMITING SPECIAL NEEDS ANALYSIS 
If special needs is the chosen frame of analysis, the question remains 
how best to cabin the category. The concern in special needs jurisprudence 
has always been how to find a way to limit the application of the doctrine so 
that the general preference for a warrant and probable cause is not 
swallowed whole by the special needs exception. This is the basis for the 
one limitation already discussed: when government introduces a mass 
suspicionless search-and-seizure regime, its primary justification must be 
something other than general or “ordinary” law enforcement goals.101 This 
limitation reflects the wisdom that the special needs exception must be 
limited if the Fourth Amendment is to impose any meaningful check on the 
spread of suspicionless search regimes. 
But there is another principle that should supplement this definitional 
limitation. The goal behind limiting the special needs doctrine is the fear 
 
99 See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44 (indicating that suspicionless checkpoint violates Fourth Amendment 
where it is employed “primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes”); Chandler v. Miller, 
520 U.S. 305, 320 (1997) (rejecting invocation of special needs exception where “ordinary law 
enforcement” methods would suffice). 
100  496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
101  See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 77–83; id. at 86 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Edmond, 
531 U.S. at 37. 
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that law enforcement will seek to use the special needs exception to carry 
out run-of-the-mill criminal investigations despite lacking individualized 
suspicion or a warrant. Here, I propose that in addition to the front-end 
limitation on special needs exceptions—the non-law-enforcement 
justification—we add a back-end limitation on the uses for the evidence 
uncovered by special needs searches. In particular, I propose an 
exclusionary rule in cases in which evidence is seized during a special 
needs search or seizure. The rule would prohibit the use of such evidence 
for prosecuting any crime except for that which is closely related to the 
special needs purpose. In the context of airport searches, for instance, 
evidence discovered during the search would only be admissible for crimes 
related to hijacking or terrorism, but not for drug-related charges. 
Although the vast majority of air travelers who carry no contraband 
whatsoever may find little comfort in this proposal, the limitation would 
reduce the likelihood that the special needs exception will be used as an 
end-run around traditional Fourth Amendment requirements. Recall that the 
special needs justification is supposed to be sufficient, on its own, to justify 
the significant expense and intrusion on the public associated with a mass 
suspicionless search-and-seizure regime. This is what is meant by “ordinary 
law enforcement” goals not being the principal purpose for the regime. If 
this is correct, then special needs searches should still be desirable and 
feasible even if law enforcement is denied the collateral benefit of using 
evidence to prosecute crimes unrelated to the special needs justification. 
This approach to special needs searches was hinted at in some of the 
cases from the 1970s that reviewed the earlier FAA airport searches. Thus, 
while the First Circuit held that routine searches at airports are 
constitutional “because the compelling public interest in curbing air piracy 
generally outweighs their limited intrusiveness,”102 the court also 
distinguished between the permissibility of such searches and the 
introduction of evidence seized during them.103 Similarly, in a Fifth Circuit 
case, two judges expressed hesitation about the introduction of drug 
evidence obtained through airport searches, and one explicitly adopted a 
rule of exclusion for evidence unrelated to the original purpose of the 
FAA’s search.104 The Second Circuit also adverted to these proposals for 
 
102  United States v. Doe, 61 F.3d 107, 109–10 (1st Cir. 1995). 
103  Id. at 110 (concluding that the subsequent warrantless search of blocks of drugs once they had 
been removed from the security checkpoint was unconstitutional); see also United States v. $124,570 
U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1245–48 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that the discovery and suppression 
of contraband for the primary purpose of enforcing criminal laws and encouraged by rewarding airport 
law enforcement personnel was unconstitutional). 
104  United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275–76 (5th Cir. 1973) (upholding the use of 
evidence in drug prosecution that had been seized as a result of the search of a passenger who fit the 
FAA’s antiskyjack profile). In Skipwith, Judge Bailey Aldrich would have excluded the evidence from 
trial but also would have rejected the rule proposed by the defendant that he should have been permitted 
to leave the airport rather than submit to the search. Id. at 1280–81 (Aldrich, J., dissenting). Judge John 
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exclusion when it upheld a conviction for heroin trafficking that was the 
product of an airport search.105 The court agreed that the search of the 
defendant’s beach bag (after the magnetometer had been alerted) was 
reasonable because of the government’s high interest in preventing 
hijackings, the minimal stigma of the search, and the limited intrusion.106 
But the court recognized that the government might abuse the faith placed 
in it and rely on airport searches “not for the purpose intended but as a 
general means for enforcing the criminal laws.”107 In those circumstances, 
the court proposed limiting abuse by permitting the introduction of 
evidence at trial only where it related to the security purpose of the 
search.108 Tellingly, it was this Second Circuit case that the Supreme Court 
explicitly referenced when it suggested in dicta that airport searches were 
undoubtedly constitutional.109 
Adopting this kind of exclusionary rule is also consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s articulation of the special needs doctrine. In almost every 
special needs case, one of the principal indications that law enforcement 
was not the primary purpose of the special needs search was that none of 
the evidence—even that which was related to the special needs 
justification—was used or even disclosed to law enforcement agencies.110 
 
Simpson suggested that he would be inclined not to permit the introduction of drug evidence obtained 
through airport searches but, unlike Judge Aldrich, did not think circuit precedent permitted it. Id. at 
1279–80 (Simpson, J., concurring specially). 
105  United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974). 
106  Id. 
107  Id. 
108  Id. (citing Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1280–81 (Aldrich, J., dissenting)). For some time, the Ninth 
Circuit adopted a more muscular version of this exclusionary rule. See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 
893 (9th Cir. 1973), overruled by United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007). The Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that, to deter the expansion of airport searches into a “general search for evidence of 
crime,” it would exclude evidence obtained as a result of such general searches. Id. at 908–09. 
109  Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 & n.3 (1989). 
110  Thus, the Court in Ferguson v. City of Charleston emphasized the fact that, in prior cases 
involving suspicionless searches of railroad employees, customs officers, and public schoolchildren, a 
key component in each search regime was that none of the test results were turned over to law 
enforcement for use in prosecution. See 532 U.S. 67, 79–80 & n.16 (2001) (summarizing cases in which 
the “‘special need’ that was advanced . . . was one divorced from the State’s general interest in law 
enforcement”). Prior to Ferguson, the only special needs case in which evidence was gathered and used 
in a criminal prosecution was one in which the search was carried out based on individualized suspicion. 
See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872–73, 879 & n.6 (1987) (upholding the warrantless search of 
a probationer’s home). After this case, the Court reserved the question of whether an administrative 
scheme that routinely provided evidence for use in criminal prosecutions would satisfy the special needs 
doctrine. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79 n.15 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 
621 n.5 (1989)). Since Ferguson, the Court has decided an additional special needs case in which no 
evidence was disclosed to law enforcement. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 833–34 (2002) 
(rejecting a challenge to drug testing middle and high school student participants in extracurricular 
activities). In two cases, the Court upheld the use of evidence seized during a suspicionless intrusion, 
without resting on special needs analysis. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 851–56 (2006) 
(permitting suspicionless search of parolee); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424–26 (2004) (permitting 
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My proposal here is to formalize the deterrence principle implicit in the 
special needs exception and accepted to a limited degree in some early 
airport search cases. In my view, it is the best way to permit the use of 
suspicionless airport searches without undermining important Fourth 
Amendment protections. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Essay is to generate debate regarding the best way 
to conceptualize and apply Fourth Amendment doctrine to the TSA’s new 
airport search regime. As I have indicated above, in some ways, the 
simplest approach is to find the new search regime to be unconstitutional. 
At least until new technology is developed that minimizes the intrusion 
occasioned by AIT scanners, it is hard to fit the TSA’s program into 
existing precedent. But, assuming that most courts will feel compelled to 
find some constitutional nook in which to fit the new search regime, the 
special needs justification—modified by the exclusionary rule I propose 
here—will best cabin it. 
There are complexities that I do not have the space to address here. For 
instance, where do searches that uncover prohibited weapons fall into my 
proposed framework? Surely there is a strong argument for holding that 
evidence of the possession of handguns and other weapons is close enough 
to the security justification for the TSA’s searches that such evidence 
should not be excluded from a subsequent prosecution. On the other hand, 
if special needs searches are really the kinds of searches that should take 
place regardless of whether they vindicate ordinary law enforcement goals, 
why permit prosecutors to use any evidence discovered through such 
searches, even evidence of terrorism? Perhaps such evidence should be 
introduced in civil detention proceedings instead. These are difficult 
questions that I cannot answer in the space I have here, but that I hope will 
be the subject of a future conversation. 
 
suspicionless “information-seeking highway stops”). But the Court has yet to resolve the question it 
posed in the Ferguson footnote: namely, whether an administrative search regime that routinely 
generated evidence for prosecution could be upheld under “special needs.” 
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